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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
  quantum step needs to be taken to upgrade and adapt the 
structure of financial oversight in the EU. The financial crisis 
exposed dangerous weaknesses in the regulatory and oversight 
structure that need to be urgently corrected to restore confidence in the 
financial system and to keep the single market alive. To date, EU policy-
makers have not been sufficiently willing to consider changes in the 
institutional structure. We believe that this position is no longer tenable, for 
the following reasons: 
•  The EU Council of finance ministers has increased the number and 
magnitude of tasks assigned to the supervisory (Level 3 or 
Lamfalussy) committees – CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS – to absurd 
levels, tasks that far exceed their mandate, capabilities or 
competences. 
•  Supervisory opinion-sharing and information consolidation remain 
the Achilles heel of the single financial market. A common data pool, 
a succinct number of common supervisory data formats and data-
sharing with non-supervisory authorities simply do not exist.  
•  Placing trust in Colleges of supervisors is a provisional solution for 
the present, not a sustainable one for the long-term. Colleges 
strengthen the bilateral spaghetti model of European supervision, at 
the expense of a truly integrated and consolidated oversight. In 
addition, colleges need to work in a context of non-harmonised 
statutes, mandates and powers of national supervisors, which greatly 
undermines their effectiveness. 
•  The basis for cooperation between national treasuries, central banks 
and supervisors are Memoranda of Understanding. The total number 
of authorities involved in such MoUs and their non-binding nature 
make these instruments almost entirely unworkable in an EU context, 
and all the more so in times of crisis. 
Certain conditions are of critical importance during a financial crisis: 
a clear hierarchy in the decision-making structure, up-to-date supervisory 
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information and competence to act. As events have demonstrated, with a 
multitude of supervisory authorities in charge, these conditions are not in 
place in the EU today. On the contrary, the asymmetries in the supervisory 
systems in the EU are widespread, rapidly causing confusion, 
misunderstandings, and even mistrust and ring-fencing in times of trouble.  
The creation of a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), 
modelled upon the ESCB, is the way to overcome these weaknesses. Under 
an ESFS, EU supervisors would work under a single umbrella, a single 
institutional structure, on the basis of harmonised principles and statutes, 
but with full application of the subsidiarity principle.  
Against this background, this report puts forward three 
recommendations: 
1)  The European Council should formally mandate the High-Level 
Expert Group on EU financial supervision to analyse the optimal 
structure of financial oversight and propose concrete steps leading to 
a European System of Financial Supervisors; 
2)  A European Financial Institute should be created to lay the 
groundwork for the establishment of the European System of 
Financial Supervisors; and 
3)  The European System of Financial Supervisors should be given 
definitive target date to commence operations. 
The intention of the ESFS would not be to create a single European 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). Rather, it would follow the ‘twin peaks’ 
or objective-based model of supervision, based on the subsidiarity 
principle. Only those tasks that can be better performed at the European 
level would be centralised, namely crisis management, data-sharing and 
macro-prudential oversight, pooling of expertise in the supervision of large 
systemically important financial institutions, mediation amongst 
supervisors and supervisory decision-making. In this spirit, conduct of 
business control would largely remain at national level. 
A European Resolution Trust should be created to work in tandem 
with the ESFS as a mechanism to address solvency problems in 
systemically important European-wide financial institutions. The European 
Resolution Trust would be managed by the European Investment Bank.  
These moves should be widely communicated to European citizens to 
restore confidence in the financial system and in the single financial 
market.  | 3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
he financial crisis sounded a rude wake-up call for EU policy-makers 
and confronted them with the limits of the present framework for 
European financial supervisory cooperation. What had been 
established and functioned well during good times proved completely 
inadequate for crisis situations. In the absence of a European safety net or a 
European crisis coordination mechanism, EU member states fell back on 
national responses, which now threaten to unravel the single market. 
Financial market integration had made powerful strides in the years 
leading up to the start of the financial crisis. Assets held by the 15 largest 
EU banks in other EU countries had doubled in the period 1997-2006. 
Several EU countries had become bridgeheads to a mighty financial 
services industry, active all across the globe. But financial supervision had 
not kept pace with these developments. Supervisors are by and large still 
working within the same structures as before the start of monetary union, 
with the home country ultimately in charge of the supervisory and lender 
of last resort functions. In several EU member states, including a country as 
large as the UK, the total sum of assets controlled by the banking sector is 
five (5) times larger than the GDP of the country in question (see the table 
in Annex 1).  
This CEPS Task Force was launched on 10 March 2008, in connection 
with a CEPS meeting on the EU’s reaction to the global financial market 
turmoil, with Pervenche Beres, MEP, and David Wright, Deputy Director-
General of the EU Commission, as keynote speakers. The name of the Task 
Force is reminiscent of a CEPS study published some 18 years ago, entitled 
Concrete Steps towards Monetary Union (Gros & Thygesen, 1990). Although 
we are fully aware of the difference in significance between both plans, 
now is the time to put in place realistic roadmap to move to a more 
integrated structure of financial oversight. The methods and steps that 
were taken in the run-up to monetary union can serve as a useful model.  
T 4 | INTRODUCTION 
This report starts with an overview of the 2007-08 financial crisis from 
a European perspective. We will thereby often distinguish between two 
different phases, the period from August 2007 until August 2008, and the 
period following. In the second section, we analyse the reaction of policy-
makers to the crisis, focusing initially on the roadmap of the finance 
ministers, and successively on the attempts to unfreeze the interbank 
market and the large bail-out plans of national governments. In the third 
section, we analyse the proposals for European regulatory and supervisory 
reform, and put forward a set of concrete proposals. 
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1.  THE 2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS: 
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
he impact of the US subprime crisis on the European financial system 
went far beyond what most had dared to predict. What started as a 
problem related to one specific asset class in one region, rapidly 
affected the entire financial system in industrialised countries throughout 
the world, and the non-financial economy. The market for structured 
products collapsed, investors withdrew from the asset-backed securities 
market and the fear that some banks may be in trouble provoked a gridlock 
in the interbank money market, spreading in a second phase to citizens. 
The growing mistrust in the financial system led European governments, 
following the US initiative, to orchestrate a massive bail-out of €1,873 
billion by mid-October 2008.  
The 2007-08 financial crisis can be subdivided into two phases. 
During the first, lasting from August 2007 to August 2008, many banks 
took on ever-increasing amounts of losses related to asset-backed securities. 
In the second phase, starting in September 2008, with the bail-out in the US 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the insurance group AIG and the 
bankruptcy of Lehman, the crisis became systemic, because of the 
generalised loss of confidence, leading to the massive bail-out plans on 
both sides of the Atlantic. To date, the costs suffered by the financial system 
related to the subprime losses and write-downs was estimated to amount 
to almost $1 trillion, of which over one-quarter was carried by European 
banks. In the second phase, the issue was no longer the total amount of 
write-downs, but rather how to keep the system afloat at (almost) any cost. 
The financial crisis was not a European crisis, nor was there a 
European response. Throughout the crisis, the impact on and the response 
from European countries have been heterogeneous. During the first phase, 
it was clear that the write-downs and losses concerned some banks more 
than others: it impacted, in decreasing order of importance, mainly banks 
in Switzerland, Germany, the UK and France. Banking sectors were 
affected in more countries in the second phase, but the response varied, 
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depending upon local circumstances. The UK plan, announced by Gordon 
Brown on 7 October 2008, was the first large European plan, followed by 
varying degrees and in different ways by other European states. 
Judging from the continuing spreads in the interbank market, the 
financial problems are far from over. The period of de-leveraging and re-
capitalisation in the financial sector can be expected to last for a long time. 
A prominent characteristic of the product to which the financial turmoil is 
related, real estate, is that prices are sluggish to react to changes in trends 
and hence cycles tend to be long (Gros, 2007). 
The question arises what the impact of this crisis will be on financial 
disintermediation in Europe, which had developed at impressive rates 
since the start of monetary union. The development of mature capital 
markets in Europe was one of the hallmarks of the EU’s Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP), but recent developments have put a sharp brake on 
this process. Recent Commission proposals would reverse the trend, 
penalise securitisation and strengthen financial intermediation.1  
1.1  Impact on the European banking system 
The financial sector is going through a lengthy period of de-leveraging, 
which will take many years to accomplish. As banks need to improve their 
capital ratios, liquidity premia can be expected to be high for a long period 
of time. As could be observed in the first year of the crisis, there are several 
ways in which banks can improve their balance sheets: through rights 
issues, capital injections by sovereign wealth funds or the state, asset sell-
offs and cost-cutting. Banks can be expected to focus more on recurrent 
forms of income in the retail and corporate lending side of the business. At 
the same time the profitability will decline considerably from the high 
levels that were recorded over the last three years.  
What is remarkable from a European perspective is not only that the 
exposure of the European banks to the US subprime market was so 
pronounced, but also that this vulnerability was not evenly spread across 
countries. Banks in countries such as Italy and Spain were less affected by 
                                                      
1 See Art. 122a proposed amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
in the area of securitisation, in which the European Commission proposed that 
banks should hold capital for at least 10% of their securitised exposures. This was 
reduced to 5% in the EU Council compromise, reached on 2 December 2008 (see p. 
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the crisis, whereas in others, most notably Switzerland, Germany and the 
UK, the losses were serious, leading to national debates about bank 
governance and supervision in the first phase, and large bail-outs in the 
second.  
It is difficult to calculate an exact figure for the losses the European 
banking system incurred in the subprime crisis. The data published to date 
are mostly based on 2007 annual reports and are thus incomplete, as they 
do not include the write-downs announced since early 2008. One may have 
to wait for the 2008 reporting season to get the full picture. It must be kept 
in mind that the losses are often write-downs on the value of the asset-
backed securities. As long as the banks that purchased them will hold on to 
them, these securities may still be re-valued, if the value of the underlying 
property recovers. In addition, it is difficult to determine what exactly a 
European bank is. A bank like HSBC, which suffered write-downs of about 
$33.1 billion, is headquartered in the UK, but has strong south-east Asian 
roots. IKB, in contrast, which had losses of about $13 billion, is an entirely 
German bank. 
Table 1. Subprime losses and write-downs (up to 17/11/08) 
$ billions  Losses/write-downs  Capital raised 
Worldwide 966.1  827.4 
Americas 664.4  483 
Europe 272.6  303.5 
Asia 29.1  40.8 
EU27-based banks  206.2   
…EU27 % of total  21.3%   
Source: Bloomberg. 
The estimates of the total losses related to the subprime crisis to date 
amount to $966 billion, of which more than $272 billion is with banks 
headquartered in Europe ($206 billion for the EU or 21%).2 Should this be 
considered as a huge oversight on behalf of European banks? As the 
underlying assets are largely based in the US, and mostly in a high-risk 
segment (subprime), it could be considered as a large exposure of the 
European banking system to a part of the US market. However, a write-
down of $206 (€160) billion on a balance sheet total of €41,072 billion of the 
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EU banking system (2007 data) corresponds to 0.4%, which is not excessive. 
Moreover, the balance sheet total of the European banking system is four 
times larger than in the US, which stands at €7,688 billion (2007, only 
commercial banks). Hence the European exposure to the subprime is, ceteris 
paribus, limited as compared to that of the US. 
A similar situation occurred during the East Asia crisis of 1998, when 
it appeared that the aggregate exposure of European banks to debt from 
Asian, Latin American and East European countries stood at about €400 
billion (end of 1997). This corresponded to 2% of the total balance sheet of 
€19,636 billion of the European banking system, or about three times the 
€125 billion exposure of the North American banks (US and Canada). 
Moreover, lending by European banks to these regions had increased 
strongly in the three years up to the crisis, even after the first signs of 
trouble in the emerging markets became apparent in July 1997 (BIS, 1998). 
That crisis also raised questions about internal risk management within 
European banks, and external control over lending policies. 
With regard to the exposure from a national perspective, similar 
considerations apply a fortiori as to what extent a bank can be called 
national. German Landesbanken are by and large German, but British and 
Swiss commercial banks are internationally very active, especially in the 
US, and hence it is probable that they suffered losses in their international 
activities, and in particular in the US. The large losses by the German state-
owned banks thus stand out as surprising. The combined write-downs of 
IKB, Bayerische Landesbank, West LB, LB Baden Württemberg and LB 
Sachsen stood at about $28.4 (€22) billion (on total assets of the German 
savings banks of €1,045 billion (2007)). Nevertheless, as the internationally 
active banks are headquartered and have their consolidated oversight in 
their home countries, it raises the question whether there is a certain 
analogy with a governance and supervision system. Also, from a national 
perspective, the combined write-downs of the two dominant Swiss banking 
groups of $54.2 (€42) billion (on a Swiss GDP of €309 billion in 2007!), raises 
existential questions about the Swiss banking industry and the Swiss 
financial centre. 
This observed difference in the impact on national banking systems 
can be traced in the profitability figures, but not in the Basel tier 1 capital 
ratios data. On the basis of data published in the 2007 Annual Report of the 
BIS, profits of the major banks in Switzerland, Germany and France fell 
seriously and to a lesser extent in the UK. Spanish banks on the other hand 
saw an increase in pre-tax profits, even with a sizeable increase in loan loss CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS MORE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN THE EU | 9 
provisions, whereas Italian banks withstood the crisis well. The ‘regulatory’ 
capital ratios seemed to be much less affected, and certainly not yet a 
reason for concern, although the question can be raised whether they are 
sufficiently indicative. The (non-weighted) average tier one in the panel 
below declined from 8.2 to 8% in 2007. The same could be said for the loan-
loss provisions, which has to take into account the major that the major 
losses of the banks discussed above were not on the banking book, but on 
the trading book. 
Table 2. Profitability ratios of major banksa (as a percentage of total average assets) 
  Pre-tax profits  Loan loss 
provisions 
Net interest 
margin 
Operating costs 
 2005  2006  2007  2005  2006  2007  2005  2006  2007  2005 2006 2007 
Austria (3)  0.85  1.64  1.29  0.30  0.38  0.28  1.64  1.90  2.24  2.10 2.40 2.40 
Australia (4)  1.52  1.62  1.67  0.14  0.13  0.15  1.92  1.96  2.01  1.70 1.64 1.63 
Canada (5)  1.01  1.32  1.27  0.10  0.10  0.14  1.79  1.64  1.68  3.00 2.56 2.57 
Switzerland (6)  0.66  0.87  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.63  0.53  0.45  1.67 1.73 1.70 
Germany (7)b 0.38  0.55  0.28  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.65  0.68  0.52  0.96 1.32 0.98 
Spain (5)  1.15  1.51  1.65  0.23  0.33  0.41  1.55  1.78  1.94  1.70 1.91 1.96 
France (5)  0.76  0.87  0.41  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.93  0.76  0.47  1.47 1.43 1.28 
United Kingdom (8)  0.87  0.97  0.67  0.23  0.27  0.23  1.23  1.26  0.94  1.59 1.70 1.36 
Italy (4)  1.23  1.12  0.88  0.23  0.26  0.25  1.95  1.93  1.71  2.34 2.34 2.01 
Japan (13)b 0.66  0.67  0.50  0.12  0.15  0.13  0.89  0.97  0.75  1.05 1.15 0.80 
Netherlands (4)  0.58  0.57  0.38  0.05  0.10  0.10  1.09  1.17  0.99  1.29 1.48 1.37 
Sweden (4)  0.90  1.06  0.98  0.01  -0.03  0.01  1.03  1.08  1.07  1.07 1.11 1.07 
United States (11)  1.93  1.82  1.02  0.20  0.20  0.56  2.72  2.50  2.47  3.44 3.12 3.51 
a All values are IFRS; the number of banks included is shown in parentheses. 
b Values are a mix of local and US GAAP. 
Sources: Bankscope; FitchRatings. 
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Table 3. Capital and liquidity ratios of major banksa 
  Tier 1 capital/risk-
weighted assets 
Non-performing 
loans/total assets 
Net loans/total 
deposits 
  2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
Austria (3)  7.7  8.9  8.1  2.3 2.1 1.8  56.4  58.1  63.2 
Australia (4)  7.5  7.2  6.8  0.1 0.2 0.2  88.3  89.8  85.1 
Canada (5)  9.9  10.4  9.6  0.3 0.2 0.2  58.3  56.2  57.2 
Switzerland (4)  11.7  11.7  9.8 0.2 0.2 0.1  25.2  26.1  27.3 
Germany (7)  8.4  8.4  8.0  1.0 0.6 0.8  36.2  30.4  25.4 
Spain  (5)  7.9 7.6 7.9 0.5 0.5 0.6  69.9  76.7  76.1 
France (4)  8.1  7.9  7.4  1.2 1.2 1.3  32.3  36.5  25.8 
United Kingdom (7)  7.5  7.9  7.6 0.8 0.7 0.8  54.8  54.5  51.1 
Italy  (4)  4.7 5.0 6.6 4.0 3.2 3.1  42.7  49.6  70.9 
Japan (10)  7.3  7.9  7.4  1.1 1.0 0.9  53.1  55.1  62.5 
Netherlands (4)  10.4  9.4  10.0 0.6 0.6 0.4  54.1  55.8  55.1 
Sweden (4)  7.1  7.2  7.1  0.4 0.4 0.3  71.7  74.2  74.9 
United States (11)  8.4  8.6  8.0 0.3 0.3 0.6  63.4  63.6  61.5 
a Weighted averages by banks’ total assets; in per cent; the number of banks included is 
shown in parentheses. 
Source: Bankscope as reproduced in BIS (2008a), 2007 Annual Report, BIS, Basel. 
As indicated above, the full cost of the crisis will only be known from 
the 2008 reporting season onwards. The year 2007 was the combination of a 
sparkling first half, and the start of the crisis and the write-downs in the 
second. The full impact of the crisis will thus only be reflected in the 
profitability and capital ratios from 2008 onwards. However, it is clear that 
2007 will be a trend break of continuously rising profits in the banking 
sector since 2003. The post-crisis period will be a different era altogether. 
The same disconnect between a fundamental decline in profitability 
figures and capital ratios can be observed in the US. Whereas the 
profitability of US commercial banks was cut in half, the capital ratios 
stayed almost at the same level. The write-downs since mid-2007 
eliminated all of the profits made by the 10 largest US banks over the 
period 2004-07.3 
The big difference between the EU and the US banking system, 
however, is the level of leverage, or the share of core capital on total assets. 
A rough comparison reveals that the level of leverage in the EU is almost 
double that in the US, or to say it the other way around, the level of own 
                                                      
3 “Vanished profits”, New York Times, 17 October 2008. CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS MORE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN THE EU | 11 
funds in the EU is half what it is in the US, with all the problems this can 
entail in a context of loss-taking. Table 4 below shows the size of total bank 
assets as a share of GDP of the top five banks based in a selected group of 
countries, the loan-to-deposit ratio, or the degree of underfunding, and the 
leverage ratio. The Basel tier 1 ratio is added as a point of comparison 
(based on BIS data referred to in the previous table). It shows worrying low 
levels of core capital, and an unclear relationship between the Basel tier 1 
and the core capital ratio. For the EU, it also demonstrates marked 
differences in the average capital ratios between the southern and northern 
European countries (see also Table A1 in Annex for a full overview).  
Table 4. Core bank soundness ratios in selected EU countries and the US, 2007 
 
Top 5 bank assets 
as % of GNP 
Loans 
to deposits 
Core 
capital ratio 
Basel 
tier 1 ratio 
Belgium 463  104  4   
France 293  101  3.5  7.4 
Germany 165  94  2.6  8 
Ireland 404  197  3.6   
Italy 131  161  7.4  6.6 
Netherlands 521  125  3.8  10 
Spain 184  250  7.2  7.9 
UK 313  125  3.9  7.6 
EU 27  237  133  4.3   
Switzerland 756  69  3.2  9.8 
US 44  91  7.6  8 
Sources: Bankscope, Eurostat, BIS. 
The difference between the core capital ratios and the Basel ratios is 
even more pronounced in individual cases. The Belgian bank Dexia, an 
early casualty of the crisis, had a Basel tier 1 ratio of 11.4% in June 2008, but 
a core capital ratio of only 1.6%. 
Table 5. Basel tier 1 and core capital ratios for selected banks 
   Basel tier 1 ratio  Core capital ratio 
   end 2007  Jun-08  end 2007  Jun-08 
Fortis  9.5 7.4 3.8 3 
Dexia 9.1  11.4  2.4  1.6 
ING 7.4  8.15  2.8  2.2 
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1.2  Impact on the European insurance sector: Less discussed 
The insurance sector is a much smaller actor in the financial system than 
are the banks. Total assets are about one-fifth of the banking sector in the 
EU. They are thus systemically much less important. Insurance companies 
are mostly liability-driven, meaning, as long as their risks on the liabilities 
side (life insurance, mass risk) are well controlled, and the assets to cover 
these risks are well diversified, they should not face too many problems. 
Unlike banks, insurance companies are less cyclical: demand for mass risk 
and life insurance should be fairly stable over time. The main risk in the 
context of this crisis should be related to bad investments, or overexposure 
to the real estate markets, as seems to have been the case with some 
companies. Notwithstanding this fundamental difference with the banking 
sector, it seems that markets have put the insurance sector in the same 
basket as the banks. Indexes have gone down almost to the same degree as 
banks.  
The concern about the insurance sector increased as a result of the 
bail-out of AIG in the US. However, this problem, together with the 
bankruptcy of Lehman, affected the banking sector more negatively, as it 
appeared that AIG had written coverage for over $300 billion of credit 
insurance for European banks. AIG itself explained these positions by 
commenting that they were “…for the purpose of providing them with 
regulatory capital relief rather than risk mitigation in exchange for a 
minimum guaranteed fee”.4 A formal default of AIG would thus have had 
a devastating impact on banks in Europe, which explains why AIG’s 
problems sent shock waves through the share prices of European banks. 
One reason why the insurance sector has been less affected by the 
crisis is the limited transparency of the published accounts. There is no 
common method to date at European or international level to measure the 
minimum solvency requirements of insurance companies, which means 
that prudential supervision is conducted in different ways across the EU. 
The European Commission’s Solvency II proposal would introduce a single 
method, but it is still under discussion in the EU Council and Parliament. In 
addition, the application of International Financial Regulatory Standards 
(IFRS) is also more limited as compared to the banking sector.5 This has not 
                                                      
4 K-10 annex of AIG annual report, quoted in Gros (2008). 
5 See for example the announcement by Allianz of the valuation of its stake in 
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prevented some groups to be exposed, and request participation in the state 
bail-out plans, such as Aegon in the Netherlands or Ethias in Belgium. 
1.3  Impact on financial market activity 
The impact on financial market activity was probably the severest, where 
the crisis broke a trend of growth in European capital markets. The hardest 
hit were the leveraged finance, asset-backed paper and securitisation 
markets, which became almost entirely frozen, whereas other segments 
remained stable, such as corporate bond issuance, at least from a European 
perspective. Issuance of corporate bonds and notes picked up in the second 
quarter, after having got off to a very low start in the first. Forecasts for the 
full year 2008 could end up at the same levels as in 2007. Leveraged finance 
issuance, on the other hand, which includes leveraged loans and high-yield 
bonds, declined to €67.0 billion for the first three quarters of 2008 compared 
to €243.3 billion over the same period in 2007.6 Securitisation issuance 
declined over the same period from €309.2 for the first three quarters of 
2007 to €26.3 billion over the same period in 2008.7 IPO activity was still 
strong until the end of 2007, but declined sharply in the first half of 2008. 
European mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issuance activity picked 
up during the second quarter of 2008 as compared to the previous quarter. 
By nationality, the largest increase was from UK borrowers, following the 
Bank of England’s announcement in April 2008 of a Special Liquidity 
Scheme that enabled UK banks to swap illiquid assets, such as mortgage-
backed securities, against UK Treasury bills (BIS, 2008b). However, the 
activity is largely concentrated in the residential MBS segment, which will 
overtake 2007 in issuance volume, whereas other segments, including ABS, 
CDOs and commercial MBS, were halved.8 
The clearest market indicator of persistent stress is the interbank 
money market rate. Since the start of the credit crisis in August 2007, 3-
month spreads of interbank (euribor) over overnight rates have jumped 
from about 10 basic points before the crisis to about 50 in the early days of 
the turmoil and about 80 basic points until the end of the summer, to reach 
                                                      
6 European Third Quarterly High Yield and Leveraged Loan Report for 2008 
(available from www.ehya.com).  
7 2008 Q3 Securitisation Data Report (www.europeansecuritisation.com). 
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over 100 basic points in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy. 
Throughout this period, central banks actively intervened to reduce 
tensions in the interbank markets, but apparently with limited success. It 
was only the government actions taken in the second half of October to 
guarantee interbank claims that managed to bring a halt to the widening 
spreads. Figure 1 shows the spread of the euribor over the eurepo rate, 
which is the rate at which one prime bank offers funds in euro to another 
prime bank in exchange for collateral – the spread of the unsecured over 
the secured lending. It shows the growing cost for unsecured lending since 
mid-2007.9  
Figure 1. Spread of the interbank money market rate (euribor) over eurepo, 
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2.  THE POLICY RESPONSE 
olicy-makers reacted early on to the mounting problems in the 
financial sector, as well at international, European and national level. 
The question that arises is what went wrong to prevent this crisis 
from turning into a full-blown systemic crisis. More especially from a 
European perspective, the Ecofin roadmap, put in place from October 2007 
onwards, seems not to have been sufficient to stop financial instability from 
spreading and spiralling out of control. Were ministers underestimating the 
depth of the problem? Were they too complacent in the belief that it was an 
essentially US grown problem? Or was it related to a policy coordination 
problem, as the inter-linkage between international, European and national 
policy levels gives rise to an unclear division of roles and confusing 
mandates?  
In October 2007, the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors 
asked the Financial Stability Forum to analyse the situation and make 
recommendations on how to improve the resilience of financial markets 
and institutions. At European level, the finance ministers discussed the 
problems in financial markets at the informal Ecofin Council in September 
2007, and came up with detailed conclusions during their October, 
December 2007, May and October 2008 meetings. But as these reactions 
seemed insufficient and the financial crisis became full-blown, heads of 
state and government stepped in and orchestrated the response within the 
Eurogroup and European Council.  
But it is above all at national level that the response was initiated, first 
as a debate about bank governance and supervision in those countries 
whose banks were badly hit. Once the crisis spilled out of control, one 
government after the other stepped in to prepare plans to re-capitalise its 
financial sector and unlock the interbank market, with differing degrees of 
conditionality. 
One of the reasons why Europe disappeared from the scene is the 
non-existence of a ‘European Treasury’. Although central banks played a 
dominant role in the first phase of the crisis, treasuries became the leading 
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actors in the second. As banks had to be recapitalised, or interbank lending 
markets guaranteed, national treasuries had to step in. The 12 October 
Eurogroup meeting tried to give some coordination to these national plans, 
which was endorsed by the European Council three days later, but it did 
not come up with a European plan. 
2.1  International level 
The lead in the reaction to the crisis was initially taken by the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF), which issued its recommendations in April 2008, but 
it was overtaken in the second phase by the G-20, convoked at the initiative 
of the French President. The G-20 foresees a reform of the Bretton Wood 
institutions with a broader participation of countries and a central role for 
the IMF to detect financial system problems.  
The FSF urges actions including strengthened prudential regulation 
and oversight, transparency in securitisation practices, limitations in the 
use of rating agents and better tools to detect stress, but it does not propose 
any fundamental shifts in the regulatory framework. Basel II and its 3 
different pillars, with some adjustments, remain the basis for financial 
oversight. The capital requirements for the trading book remain largely 
unchanged, but liquidity regulation becomes a new objective. The report 
puts a considerable burden on the Basel Committee and national 
supervisors to improve things, but it is questionable whether they will be 
capable of coping, given the fatigue related to the long and protracted 
efforts which led to the Basel II Accord in 2006 and the huge oversight 
failures that were highlighted by the crisis. The immediate requirements for 
market participants on the other hand are limited, and essentially focused 
on more disclosure. 
To improve the oversight of large internationally active groups, the 
FSF recommended the expanded use of international colleges of 
supervisors, as is also proposed by EU finance ministers. The FSF however 
stopped short of proposing any enhanced role for the IMF or BIS, or any 
other body in monitoring exposures in the financial system at large, or in 
allowing information from the colleges to be amalgamated and monitored 
more centrally. 
The G-20 meeting in Washington (15 November 2008) addressed the 
issue of strengthened international cooperation, but nothing concrete was 
decided. It proposed an enhanced role for the IMF to better identify 
vulnerabilities in the financial system and requested all G-20 members to 
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March 2009, to review the compatibility of the local regulatory systems 
with the international financial system. FSAPs have been undertaken by the 
IMF since May 1999 to analyse financial systems across the globe, but it is 
unclear how, in the current global governance framework, their 
enforcement can be strengthened.10 
What the role will be for the European Commission in this global 
governance framework remains to be seen. The Commission has over the 
last years been strongly involved in regulatory dialogues with the US and 
increasingly with other third countries, but was not represented in 
international fora such as the FSF. Reporting lines from the G-7 or G-20 go 
directly to its member states, and the international organisations involved. 
Regional organisations, such as the EU, seem not to have a clear role. 
2.2  European level  
The EU response was initially crystallised in the ‘roadmap’, adopted in 
October 2007, and further enhanced and updated in successive EU Council 
of finance ministers meetings. The roadmap moved to a second plan from 
October 2008 onwards, as the main concern became the national bail-out 
plans and their implications for European integration.  
2.2.1  The Ecofin roadmap and the 1st phase of the crisis 
The ‘roadmap’ is an extensive action plan, with a long series of measures to 
be taken by certain target dates. It was an early indication of the EU’s 
responsiveness to the crisis and its preparedness to make the adaptations in 
the regulatory and supervisory framework. At the same time, however, it 
emphasised at several occasions that no deep structural change would be 
undertaken. On the contrary, the prevailing view was that the current 
institutional structure should suffice, which is entirely unrealistic, as the 
analysis below will show. 
The October 2007 Ecofin Council, in response to the first signs of 
market stress, agreed on common principles for cross-border financial crisis 
management and on a roadmap to practically enhance supervisory 
cooperation. The common principles aim to protect the stability of the 
financial system and to minimise harmful impacts on the economy. In the 
                                                      
10 See http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp for hundreds of FSAP 
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statement released to the press following the meeting, the Ministers 
insisted that they will “carefully cooperate” in the case of a cross-border 
crisis and will react “based on common terminology and on a common 
analytical framework”. It built upon difficult work undertaken in recent 
years in the context of the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on 
financial crisis management and burden sharing.11 
The December 2007 Ecofin Council spelled out the role of the EU’s 
regulatory and supervisory committees in this context. It asked the 
Commission to consider various options to strengthen the Level 3 
Committees, but “without unbalancing the current institutional structure”, 
a sentence that was repeated by later Ecofin Councils. The Level 3 
Committees, which have a mere consultative role, were requested to 
strengthen the national application of their guidelines “without changing 
their legally non-binding nature”, and to enhance their efficiency “by 
introducing…qualified majority voting where necessary”. The Level 3 
Committees were asked to analyse the options of “voluntary delegation of 
supervisory competences”. To deal with the growing workload of the Level 
3 Committees, the Commission was asked to consider more financial 
support under the EU budget. 
In a letter to all his European colleagues dated 26 November 2007, the 
Italian minister Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, called for formal changes in EU 
legislation to entrust the Level 3 Committees with the powers to adopt 
binding decisions, and to endow them with adequate financial and human 
resources to perform their tasks.12 He observed that, in view of the financial 
market turmoil, the European financial system was still unable to 
effectively respond to the challenges of a globally integrated market. 
Voluntary agreements, the Italian minister remarked, proved incapable of 
ensuring an efficient area-wide supervisory teamwork during crisis 
episodes. The Level 3 Committees should therefore be turned into agencies, 
with the power to set binding standards and to take decisions in a limited 
                                                      
11 Work on crisis management and burden-sharing started in the EFC in 2004, but 
was the subject of deep controversy between the member states on the need for a 
formal agreement on these matters. Cross-border crisis management exercises and 
simulations have been conducted on a regular basis in recent years. 
12 The letter was published in abridged form on 11 December 2007 in the Financial 
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number of areas. The proposal however was hardly discussed in the Ecofin 
Council. 
The debate on the appropriate governance structure accelerated in 
the run-up to the informal Spring Ecofin Council, which took place in 
Lublijana in April 2008, with clearer positions from different member 
states. The British Chancellor Alistair Darling proposed to establish 
supervisory colleges by EU law and create cross-border stability groups to 
respond to financial crisis (3 March 2008). The Italian Minister reiterated his 
proposal to turn the Level 3 Committees into EU agencies. And the 
Hungarian Prime Minister proposed a uniform European financial 
supervisory authority, based on the model of the ESCB (21 February 2008). 
The informal Ecofin, to which Alexandre Lamfalussy was invited, 
discussed the EU dimension of supervision, but without coming to a 
concrete proposal. 
The May 2008 Ecofin Council affirmed and increased the tasks 
assigned to the Level 3 Committees. In addition to the earlier tasks, these 
bodies were asked to develop a common European supervisory culture, to 
ensure efficient cooperation across financial sectors and to monitor 
financial stability and reporting risks to the Economic and Financial 
Committee (EFC). On the latter task, the Council stressed “that the EU 
Committees of supervisors should be able to gather aggregate information 
in order to assess these features within and across financial sectors and to 
alert the EFC on potential and imminent threats in the financial system.” 
One may wonder however whether the Council fully realised what it was 
asking of the Committees, with each of them employing only about 15 
persons. Asking ECB’s Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) to join forces 
with CEBS and to “ensure an efficient and appropriate division of labour 
amongst these two” is unrealistic, as the institutional contexts in which 
both bodies operate is entirely different and not comparable.13 
On the supervision of EU-wide financial groups, the May 2008 Ecofin 
Council put its faith in the colleges of supervisors, as the FSF had also 
proposed. To allow these entities to function, a new memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) on cross-border financial stability was signed 
amongst the supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries. 
It specifies a much clearer and more explicit division of responsibilities and 
                                                      
13 2866th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 14 May 2008, 
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tasks amongst the signatories than what had been in place so far.14 It spells 
out common definitions and principles, rules on information exchange and 
cooperation agreements applicable in normal times and periods of crisis. 
No less than 113 (!) authorities are signatories to the agreement, which is a 
very high number considering that close to one-half of the member states 
have a single FSA, and that EEA countries are not included. In case of 
specific agreements pertinent to the supervision of financial groups, 
however, only those national authorities will be involved where a financial 
group has a presence. The agreement takes the form of an MoU, i.e. it is not 
legally binding and cannot give rise to any legal claim, although it was, for 
the first time, made public in full.  
2.2.2  A full-blown systemic crisis 
Policy-makers only started to realise the full scale of the financial crisis by 
the end of September 2008. Before that time, they continued to believe that 
this was essentially a US-grown problem, and that it would not affect the 
European financial system profoundly.15 The succession of events in 
October 2008 dramatically brought home the message that Europe had an 
enormous problem of undercapitalisation in the banking sector, and that 
only a massive state-led recapitalisation would bring the systemic crisis to a 
halt. Calls for a European solution fell on deaf ears, and the reaction to the 
problems from Fortis onwards were entirely in national hands, with only 
an appearance of European coordination. 
The state-led rescue of Fortis during the weekend of 27-28 September 
2008 signalled the start of a series of bank bail-outs across the EU, on a 
case-by-case basis, or as part of a general plan. The EU was absent during 
the earlier part of the crisis, and it was only the emergency Eurogroup 
meeting on October 12th in Paris, convoked at the initiative of President 
Sarkozy as President of the European Council, that provided some 
                                                      
14 In March 2003, the ECB initiated a memorandum of understanding on ‘high-level 
principles of co-operation between the banking supervisors and central banks of 
the European Union in crisis management situations’, which was updated in 2005. 
15 This was the main message of the historic press briefing given by the German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Steinmeyer in front of NYSE building, on 24 September 
2008, in the margins of his participation in the UN annual meeting (see for more 
info: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/AAmt/BM-Reisen/2008/VN-
Woche/vn-letzter-Tag.html). Two weeks later, the German government 
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European coordination to the national rescue plans. A call for a European 
bail-out fund, as informally discussed within the French Ministry of 
Finance, and also supported by a large group of European economists, was 
not withheld by the European G-4, which met in an emergency meeting in 
Paris on October 4th, as Germany was said to be radically opposed to any 
such fund.16 Two days later, the British prime minister was the first to 
formally announce a national bail-out plan for a select group of large 
British banks, although he added explicitly that this should “ideally be 
solved at European level.”17  
The main concern of the G-4 meeting was to get the European 
Commission’s flexibility in the approval of the national bail-out plans, as 
well from a state aid and stability pact perspective, because of the 
exceptional circumstances. The meeting called for a new framework of 
financial supervision, and suggested an international meeting on financial 
sector governance. The meeting requested the Commission and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to allow banks to 
reclassify trading book as banking book assets in order to embellish their 
balance sheets, on which a decision was taken by the finance ministers on 
October 7th. 
The Eurogroup meeting on October 12th was the first to come up with 
a European response to the crisis, in the form of a concerted action plan of 
the eurozone to temporarily guarantee bank refinancing and keep 
important banks from failing. The meeting was convened at the level of 
heads of state and government, under the chairmanship of the French 
President. The ECB president and the British prime minister Gordon Brown 
were also invited. The Eurogroup decided that:  
-  governments can provide state guarantees to bank debt issues for up 
to 5 years under well-determined conditions, and can participate in 
these issues. All banks should eligible to these operations, including 
foreign-owned banks; and 
-  governments can take equity stakes in financial institutions and 
recapitalise banks in trouble. 
Moreover, the ECB was requested to ease its rules on collateral. 
                                                      
16 “European banking crisis, A call to action” (available from www.voxeu.org) 
Financial Times, 2 October 2008. 
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Governments were asked to avoid national measures that would 
negatively affect the functioning of the internal market and harm other 
member states. They committed to ‘coordinate in providing these guarantees, as 
significant differences in national implementation could have a counter-
productive effect, creating distortions in banking markets.’ The support 
actions would be ‘designed in order to avoid any distortion in the level-
playing field and possible abuse at the expense of non-beneficiaries of these 
arrangements.’18 
The Eurogroup decisions were endorsed by the European Council, 
which met a few days later in Brussels. In addition, the European Council 
decided to establish a ‘financial crisis cell’ to act in crisis situations. This 
mechanism will bring together representatives of the Presidency-in-office, 
the President of the Commission, the President of the ECB (in conjunction 
with the other European central banks), the President of the Eurogroup and 
the governments of the member states. The Council also welcomed the 
setting up of a high-level group by the Commission to strengthen the 
supervision of the financial sector. 
The Ecofin Council had decided in the meantime to increase the 
minimum level of deposit protection to €50,000, leaving the possibility to 
the member states to increase it to €100,000. A formal Commission proposal 
on the subject was adopted a week later. The urgency of the review of the 
1994 deposit guarantee directive (1994/19/EC) was widely acknowledged 
since the September 2007 Northern Rock bail-out, but it took the European 
Commission more than one year to have a new proposal on the table. The 
Ecofin Council also adopted conclusions on executive pay and reiterated its 
call for a timely implementation of the roadmap. 
The December 2008 Ecofin Council reached a political consensus on 
four financial services directives, including the amendments to the deposit 
guarantee and the capital requirements directive, and draft solvency 
requirements directive. The agreement on the latter directive confirms the 
retreat of the European approach and asserts a prominent role for nation 
states in supervision. The ministers at the Ecofin Council rejected a draft 
clause, referred to as ‘group support’, which would have allowed capital to 
be shifted from subsidiaries in other member states to the parent company, 
and gave local supervisors the power to block such transfers. This change 
greatly disappointed the European Parliament and industry alike. The 
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December 2008 Council emphasised the need to establish, without delay, 
national schemes to support the banking sector, with respect to guarantees, 
but also and especially recapitalisation plans, in order to sustain credit. It 
called upon the European Commission to publish guidelines distinguishing 
between sound and distressed banks, and on the principles governing state 
support. 
2.3  The local debates and national bail-out plans 
Although the credit crisis is a global phenomenon, the debates remained 
largely national, with important nuances in the response. This must be kept 
in mind when considering an eventual European solution, as discussed in 
the next section. For some, the crisis has clearly demonstrated the limits of 
the current cooperative model of financial supervision, whereas for others, 
it has demonstrated the dangers of too much of a harmonised approach. 
Some countries have already made adjustments to the supervisory 
framework. Most interesting from our perspective are the changes that 
were proposed in the institutional structure at national level and how the 
roles of the different actors in financial supervision were altered.  
The Paulson report, published by the US Treasury (2008) a few days 
after the Bear Stearns collapse, is the most instructive. Although the 
drafting of the text had started well before the crisis erupted, in the context 
of the debate on the competitiveness of the US financial markets, and its 
contents essentially concern the re-design of the US supervisory system, the 
report is also relevant for the EU debate. Not only does it demonstrate a 
willingness to embrace radical change, which many in the US thought to be 
almost impossible, it also has implications for the EU structure. It should be 
recalled that US policy-makers and officials have over the last few years 
been impressed by the EU’s capacity to adapt its financial system in the 
Financial Services Action Programme (FSAP), to implement the Lamfalussy 
proposals and to create a more competitive financial market.19  
The Paulson report sees the ‘twin peaks’ model as the long-term 
ambition for the US, in which supervision is organised by objective, i.e. 
prudential versus conduct of business supervision. Such an objective-based 
model of financial supervision is in place in the Netherlands and in 
                                                      
19 See, for example, the report by the General Accountability Office (US GAO, 2004) 
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Australia.20 It recommends an enhanced regulatory and oversight role for 
the Fed, as the central authority, with day-to-day supervision in the hands 
of a prudential and a conduct of business supervisor. Today, the Fed is one 
of the four federal bank prudential supervisory authorities, and supervises 
about 15% of the top 50 US-based banks (Petschnigg, 2005, p. 35), whereas 
prudential supervision of the (until recently) powerful investment banks 
was formally in the hands of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), although it is debatable whether this was properly done.21 
In the UK, the Northern Rock bank run, the first since Victorian 
times, and the losses incurred by several blue chip financial institutions led 
to broad debate about the adequacy of the structure of financial 
supervision. Although the FSA model was not called into question, the 
Bank of England was given a more important role. The UK Parliament 
report on Northern Rock criticised the lack of leadership in handling the 
bank failure and thus the non-functioning of the Tripartite Agreement 
between the FSA, the Bank and the Treasury. It proposed the creation of a 
new post of Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and Head of 
Financial Stability.22 In his Mansion speech on 18 June 2008, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Alastair Darling, said the Government intended to 
provide a formal legal responsibility for financial stability to the bank as 
well, alongside its existing role in monetary policy. These proposals were 
confirmed in the Banking Bill of October 2008, which is expected to come 
into force in early 2009. In Germany, the large losses in state-owned 
banking institutions sparked a new debate about the relevance of the FSA 
model, put into place with the Bafin (the German financial services 
authority) in 2002, and led to calls for a greater role of the Bundesbank in 
banking supervision. 
                                                      
20 The Paulson Report came out clearly against the FSA model: “An objectives-
based approach also allows for a clearer focus on particular goals in comparison to 
a structure that consolidates all types of regulation in one regulatory body” (p. 14). 
21 According to Calomiris (2008), the Basel II rules were effectively applied by the 
SEC to investment banks. 
22 “There is a need for ‘creative tension’ within the regulatory system, and so these 
powers and responsibilities should not be granted to the Financial Services 
Authority. We propose the creation of a new post of Deputy Governor of the Bank 
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Further discussion on the structure of financial oversight was 
overtaken by the urgency of national bail-out plans for the financial sector. 
At the same time, the acceptance that radical change was needed grew 
further during the month of October 2008. On the other hand, the need for 
financial assistance brought the discussion back to the member state level, 
as there is no European Treasury, and plans for a European fund were 
shelved by the German government. By October 14th, European 
governments had committed some €1,873 billion, or about 15% of GDP of 
the EU15, to national bail-out plans in one form or another. This sum 
increased to over €2,170 billion by the end of December, and is further 
growing (see Table A3 in Annex). 
The emergence of the national treasuries in dealing with the crisis 
raises some fundamental problems for the single market. While the 
European Commission recognised the urgency of the situation, it published 
guidance for state aid measures to banks in crisis.23 The Commission 
stresses in this document that any measure taken should be exceptional, 
and that the situation in the financial sector should be reviewed every six 
months. They could otherwise “generate harmful moral hazard”.24 The 
European Commission specified several conditions that must be met in 
national support schemes: 
•  Non-discriminatory access, eligibility for support should not be based 
on nationality;  
•  State commitments to be limited in time and scope, while excluding 
unjustified benefits for shareholders;  
•  Adequate remuneration of the state financial support; 
•  Private sector contribution;  
•  Behavioural rules for beneficiaries that prevent an abuse of state 
support, such as expansion and aggressive market strategies on the 
back of a state guarantee;  
•  State aid should be followed by structural adjustment measures for 
the financial sector; and 
•  Winding-up procedures should be open and take place on market 
terms.  
                                                      
23 See State aid: Commission gives guidance to Member States on measures for 
banks in crisis, 13 October 2008 (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition). 
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It was added that observance of these principles, including in 
individual aid measures, is the responsibility of the member states, and 
subject to monitoring by the Commission. 
A quick review of the measures adopted at member state level 
indicates that these rules have already been violated several times (see the 
table in Annex 3). Overall, most schemes are only open for domestic banks, 
without a clear definition of what this means, thus leaving much discretion 
in the hands of the minister of finance. The Dutch scheme for example is 
only open for systemically important Dutch banks.25 State-sponsored 
subordinated debt schemes, which were used in the Dutch and Belgian 
context, are not permitted, according to the European Commission, as they 
protect the interests of shareholders.26 And the Fortis liquidation procedure 
was not open. The European Commission has, under the state aid rules, 
been notified of and responded to most of the general national bail-out 
plans, and also to some specific cases. It concerns so far the support 
schemes of 15 member states, in chronological order: Denmark, Ireland, the 
UK, Germany, Sweden, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Finland, 
Italy, Greece, Belgium, Austria and Slovenia. It approved many individual 
cases of aid (including Bradford & Bingley, Hypo Real Estate, Roskilde 
Bank, IKB) and launched in-depth investigations into the Northern Rock 
and WestLB bail-outs.27 
The difficulties these schemes pose to free competition led the EU 
Commission to publish a further Communication in December 2008 on the 
principles governing State recapitalisation of financial institutions 
(European Commission, 2008c). State capital injections need to be 
appropriately remunerated to avoid distortions of competition at EU level, 
but need also to take into account the different circumstances of the banks 
and financial markets in question. Lack of differentiation may also weaken 
the overall competitiveness of European banks. The Commission 
Communication therefore proposes some pricing mechanisms, and a price 
                                                      
25 For a bank to qualify as an Eligible Bank under the Dutch scheme, it must satisfy 
the Bank Eligibility Criteria: 1) be a bank as defined by the Dutch Financial 
Markets Supervision Act; 2) have a corporate domicile in the Netherlands; 3) have 
substantial business in the Netherlands; and 4) have an acceptable solvency ratio. 
See Clifford Chance (2008). 
26 European Commission (2008b), p. 3, Art. 23. 
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corridor, determined by the (i) the required rate of return on subordinated 
debt representing a lower bound (being 7%) and (ii) the required rate of 
return on ordinary shares representing an upper bound (being 9.3%).  | 28 
 
3.  MODELS FOR A EUROPEAN 
REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY 
REFORM 
he debate on the reform of the European regulatory and supervisory 
structure has been running for at least a decade. It started in the 
wake of the start of monetary union, with the launch of the Financial 
Services Action Programme (FSAP) and the proposals of the Lamfalussy 
Committee. Until recently, the EU demonstrated that it was capable of 
adapting the supervisory structure and instituting a much greater degree of 
supervisory cooperation than had existed previously. 
The reform, however, had not been subjected to a crisis situation, 
having been crafted during good weather conditions, not stormy ones. 
Discussions had been going on since 2005 over burden-sharing in the event 
of cross-border bank failures, but without much result.  
The following discussion in section 3.1 should illustrate that we have 
probably reached the limits of what is possible under the current system, 
and that a quantum step needs to be taken. We review the shortcomings in 
the present regulatory and supervisory model, as the basis for formulating 
in section 3.2 a proposal for a European System of Financial Supervisors. 
3.1  Shortcomings in the present regulatory and supervisory model 
Two proposals have been debated for quite some time concerning desirable 
changes to the present supervisory model: i) upgrading the Level 3 
Committees and ii) strengthening the role of the supervisory colleges. In 
the context of European supervisory cooperation, two further issues need 
to be analysed: the functioning of memoranda of understanding, as they 
underpin cooperation among supervisory colleges, and the role of the ECB, 
as it will need to be part of a European solution.  
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3.1.1  The role of the Level 3 Committees 
The Level 3 Committees have managed to achieve a lot in a limited period 
of time, and with scarce resources. They can be credited with having eased 
the Commission’s work on the implementing measures for framework 
directives and to have contributed to supervisory convergence and a 
European supervisory culture by continuously bringing together 
supervisors from the different member states on a wide variety of matters.28 
However, it rapidly appeared that their purely advisory role was 
hampering their drive. A discussion was kicked off in 2004 by the oldest of 
the Committees, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), 
with publication of the Himalaya report (CESR, 2004), which proposed an 
enhanced role for CESR in mediating between supervisory authorities and 
in delegating supervisory responsibilities. 
Four years on, the issue is still on the table. Although the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has taken sides with CESR, it 
seems that ministers are unwilling to change the role of the Committees, as 
is evident from the Ecofin Council deliberations in May 2008, referred to 
above. CESR, and also the former Italian finance minister, argued that it 
should not be difficult to turn the Committees into formal EU agencies, like 
the existing 28 European regulatory agencies. However, this would expand 
the mandate of the Level 3 Committees from essentially regulatory 
concerns to also include supervisory matters. This raises important legal, 
accountability and eventually fiscal issues. With formal mediation and 
delegation of powers come enforcement and the authority to sanction. This, 
in turn, raises the sensitive matter of sovereignty. How will accountability 
be organised if the Committees have a more formal role? In addition, such 
changes touch upon, or could alter the allocation of responsibilities 
between home and host supervisors as set out in the EU directives. And 
what if they incur formal responsibilities in the context of a troubled bank, 
as the coordinator of national authorities, which may raise financial issues? 
Assigning a more formal role to the Committees could give them 
more clout in discussions with the member states, but this is possibly what 
some authorities are afraid of. So far, the Committees have acted more as 
an informal mediator, often coming up with the broadest possible 
consensus to come to an agreement between the member states. An 
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example is the COREP (Common Reporting Framework) project of CEBS, 
which creates a common format for banks to use in reporting solvency 
ratios. Table 6 shows how many reporting cells for core (83%) and detailed 
information (63%) banks have to use on average in COREP. The maximum 
number of cells in which a bank could be asked to report is about 18,000, 
according to CEBS, as not all detailed information is applicable to all banks. 
This very high number is seen by bankers as the lowest common 
denominator, representing a totally unworkable compromise and a 
s y m p t o m  o f  t h e  l a c k  o f  p o w e r s  o n  t h e  p a r t  o f  C E B S  t o  i m p o s e  a  t r u l y  
common (and integrated) reporting framework in the EU. 
Table 6. Framework for common reporting of the new solvency ratio 
 
Source: CEBS (2006). 
The best example of the unwillingness of the May 2008 Ecofin 
Council to revisit the structural framework is the demand to the 
Committees to report to the EU Council on key developments, risks and 
vulnerabilities that could affect the stability of the financial system, as 
referred to above. This is not a core task of the Committees in the context of 
the Lamfalussy framework, nor do they have the means to undertake it. 
That the Council also requests the involvement of the ECB’s Banking 
Supervision Committee (BSC) only emphasises the absence of realism of 
this request.  
Another example of the unclear division of roles was the demand to 
banks by the European Commission in reaction to the subprime crisis to 
provide more information on securitisation. The European Commission did 
not have up-to-date information on securitisation, nor did the Committees 
for that matter, and it had to rely on sector organisations to provide 
insights into the size and functioning of these markets.  
3.1.2  The model of colleges 
The main means by which the EU Council proposes to improve the 
supervision of with EU-wide financial groups are the supervisory colleges. CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS MORE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN THE EU | 31 
Colleges are established in case a financial institution operates in another 
member state through one or more branches or subsidiaries. The college is 
chaired by the home supervisor of the group’s parent and made up of 
authorities from all the countries in which the holding company has 
established a presence through subsidiaries or branches. Colleges function 
on the basis of mandatory written arrangements agreed upon ad hoc by the 
competent authorities to allow the home country to carry out consolidated 
supervision of the group (Art. 131 CRD, Directive 2006/48/EC).  
In reaction to the financial crisis, the Ecofin Council requested that 
the role of the colleges should be strengthened, and asked, again, that the 
EU Committees should play a role “in giving operational guidelines to 
provide consistency in the working procedures of the different colleges and 
effectiveness of the decision-making process and provide reassurance to 
supervisors involved in the colleges, as well as monitoring the coherence of 
the practices of the different colleges of supervisors and sharing best 
practices”.29 This demand was reiterated after the summer 2008, and also 
reflected at international level in the G-20 conclusions. Amendments to the 
EU’s capital requirements directive aimed at strengthening the role of 
colleges were proposed by the European Commission on 1 October 2008.30 
Such proposals are also mirrored in the draft solvency requirements 
directive for insurance companies.31 
The extensive reliance on colleges raises three major issues. Although 
supervisors work in a college, their statute, mandate, accountability, modus 
operandi and enforcement powers continue to differ importantly across the 
EU. EU legislation has introduced the single licence, and obliges 
supervisors to cooperate, but has not harmonised the national structures. 
Hence a home country authority may not have the same powers in the host 
country to enact certain disciplinary measures. The degree of independence 
                                                      
29 2866th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 14 May 2008, 
Council Conclusions, p. 13. 
30 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards banks affiliated to 
central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory 
arrangements, and crisis management, Brussels, COM(2008) 602/3.  
31 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance - Solvency II, 
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and accountability of the supervisory authority differs. And the formal 
responsibility for financial stability is limited to the national boundaries. 
Although the same problem exists at a global level, the legal framework 
and the degree of market integration differ significantly, thereby raising the 
question of whether colleges are still appropriate in the EU context. From 
this perspective, colleges were the solution for the past and may be for the 
present, but not for the future. 
The second issue raised by colleges is whether the information 
obtained is sufficiently shared and merged to have a broader picture on 
exposures in the interbank market and risks to stability of the European 
financial system. A basic problem is that the home country is supposed to 
have the full picture, not necessarily the host countries. The latter may in 
case of trouble rapidly feel badly informed, with the result that trust in the 
college disappears, and the college can no longer function as a college. This 
is related to a third problem, whether colleges effectively function as 
college in times of crisis. The information emerging from the rescue of 
Fortis in the weekend of 27-28 September 2008 is not reassuring in this 
context. The Belgian policy-makers and supervisors contacted the two most 
important host countries, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, only after 
about 48 hours of discussions.32 
Comparing the location and geographical presence of banking groups 
in the EU and Switzerland, 123 colleges should have been established in the 
EU. With 29, Germany chairs the highest number of colleges, followed by 
Switzerland (13), Italy (10), France (8) and the UK (7).33 Taking into account 
the importance of groups of which a country chairs the college, based upon 
the weighted average market shares of the countries in which the banks are 
active of which a certain country is the lead supervisors, the ranking is 
topped by Spain, followed by Belgium and the UK. The question can thus 
be raised whether these countries have the capabilities and the means to 
exercise the supervisory tasks as home country of globally active banking 
                                                      
32 According to an article by Pascale Den Dooven, a journalist for De Standaard, 15 
November 2008, the Belgian authorities only called their Dutch counterpart on 
midday on Sunday, inquiring why the Dutch had not taken contact, whereas the 
Dutch replied that they were waiting for a call. This anecdote is highly revealing 
about the efficacy of colleges, home-host relations and memoranda of 
understanding. 
33 Data collected by the Italian Bankers Association (ABI), April 2008.  CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS MORE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN THE EU | 33 
groups, and second, whether the information emerging from so many 
colleges gets sufficiently coordinated and amalgamated at European level. 
 
Figure 2. Colleges of supervisors per EU member state 
Torriero Aggiornare il sistema bancario: cosa significa in una parola? 
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3.1.3  Memoranda of Understanding: A good basis? 
Memoranda of understanding (MoUs), which essentially have a bilateral 
nature, provide the legal basis for cooperation between colleges. The recent 
capital requirements directive (2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC) further 
harmonised the structure of cooperation between the home and host 
country authorities, and clarified the obligations on both sides.34 It requires 
competent authorities to have written coordination and cooperation 
arrangements, or MoUs, in place for the supervision of banking groups. 
MoUs are not legally binding, however, and cannot give rise to any legal 
claim. The Northern Rock collapse demonstrated already how difficult it is 
for MoUs to work even at national level. At international level, the limited 
information available so far on the rescue of Fortis indicates that they are 
not effective, as discussed above. 
                                                      
34 A proposal for amendment of this directive was recently made by the European 
Commission (2008c), and provisionally agreed upon by the Ecofin Council of 2 
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MoUs are also used as a framework for information-sharing and 
coordination between the various authorities of different states to 
contribute to financial stability and crisis management. A first MoU was 
concluded by the ECB’s Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) in 2003, 
setting the specific principles and procedures for the responsible authorities 
in crisis management situations. This MoU was extended in 2005 to also 
include finance ministries, and recently radically upgraded (see above). 
The core issue of MoUs, i.e. information exchange, continues to be the 
Achilles heel of the single financial market. At a European Commission 
conference on the allocation of supervisory responsibilities, organised on 26 
June 2007 just before the current financial crisis started, it was apparent just 
how little progress had been made on information exchange between 
supervisory authorities. The lack of information exchange had already been 
criticised in the 2001 EFC report (Brouwer II report), but had hardly been 
acted upon. This was also highlighted in an IMF report, published in May 
2007, which found existing practices for supervisory cooperation and MoUs 
out of line with market developments. It called for much more ex-ante 
cooperation and information sharing than was the rule.35 
The market turmoil, which started in August 2007, highlighted that 
the reach of the MoU between supervisors, central banks and finance 
ministries was insufficient. ECB officials have on several occasions 
complained about the lack of supervisory information to make financial 
stability assessments and monitor financial stress.36 Supervisors are often 
hindered on professional secrecy grounds from exchanging this 
information with non-supervisory authorities in normal times. When they 
share the information in emergency situations, it is usually too late. It is 
highly questionable whether the new updated MoU will change this 
practice. 
Even at national level, it seemed that MoUs are precarious, as 
illustrated by the Northern Rock case, and the ensuing discussion between 
the Bank of England and FSA. After the extension of the Bank of England’s 
powers, as was proposed by Alastair Darling, the discussion still revolves 
                                                      
35 See IMF (2007). 
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around who will have the formal power to pull the trigger for a bank in 
trouble.37  
3.1.4  Role of the ECB: Not clarified 
Unlike the Fed and the Bank of England, European authorities have not 
acted so far to clarify the mandate of the European Central Bank. In 
addition to establishing a good reputation as a new central bank for 
Europe, the core task of the ECB is to maintain price stability. In 2002, Wim 
Duisenburg attempted to broaden the ECB’s role to include banking 
supervision, but he was rebuked by the finance ministers.  
According to the EU Treaty, the ECB is in charge of monetary policy 
and the smooth operation of payment systems, whereas financial 
supervision and stability remain the competence of the member states. 
Emergency liquidity assistance can be provided by national central banks 
in the Eurosystem to an institution operating in its jurisdiction, but at the 
costs to the central bank in question.38 The ECB can contribute to the 
smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating 
to prudential supervision and financial stability (Art. 105.5). Specific tasks 
concerning policies relating to prudential supervision of banks and other 
financial institutions, with the exception of insurance companies, could be 
conferred to the ECB, according to Art. 105.6, but this is seen as a last resort 
and requires the unanimity of the member states.  
Early on after its creation, the ECB attempted to enlarge its powers 
into the area of prudential supervision. In 2001, the ECB issued a paper on 
the role of central banks in prudential supervision, in which it argued 
strongly in favour of combining prudential supervision and central 
banking (ECB, 2001). It even detected a trend in this direction and refuted 
the arguments against combining both: “Arguments in favour of a 
separation of prudential supervision and central banking lose more of their 
force, while those in favour of combining become more prominent” (ECB, 
2001, p. 7). It concluded that “when viewed from a Eurosystem perspective, 
                                                      
37 “FSA should have sole right over bank rescues”, Daily Telegraph, 17 September 
2008. 
38 This happened for example with Fortis Bank, when the Belgian central bank 
provided €45 billion in emergency liquidity over the weekend of 28-29 September 
2008. The provisions applicable to these operations within the Eurosystem were 
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the attribution of extensive supervisory responsibilities (i.e. both macro- 
and micro-prudential) is likely to prove beneficial” (Ibid., p. 9). 
The ECB attempts however lead to a fierce reaction from the finance 
ministers in the Ecofin Council in 2002, with which the Ecofin until today 
may want to remain consistent. The May 2002 meeting (EFC, 2002, p. 10) 
explicitly stated that the structure for financial regulation and supervision 
must be consistent with:  
-  “The allocation of powers and responsibilities as set out in the Treaty; 
-  Appropriate accountability to EU institutions, in particular political 
accountability to the Ecofin Council; 
-  Subsidiarity, since supervisory tasks are best performed as close as 
possible to supervised entities and since financial crises may have 
implications for public finances; 
-  Neutrality with respect to models adopted at the national level.”  
Since that time, the ECB has kept a low profile on banking 
supervision matters. The ECB was part of the MoUs that were concluded 
on financial stability, but it did not make any political statements as it did 
in 2001. Only recently, it repeated on several occasions the need to have 
more supervisory information on financial institutions. As the ECB injects 
liquidity to the banking system based on appropriate collateral, it could 
suffer losses in case an illiquid bank appears to be insolvent, thereby 
underlining the “need of timely and exhaustive transmission of 
supervisory information at European level”.39 But the ECB was hardly in 
the scope of the discussions of the Ecofin Council during the first year of 
the crisis. Only its Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) was asked to step 
up the cooperation with CEBS.  
3.2  A European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) 
To respond to the shortcomings and inconsistencies discussed above, and 
to establish an effective supervisory system dealing with the current and 
future supervisory challenges, EU policy-makers will need to take a 
quantum step. With the reforms undertaken over the last years further to 
the Lamfalussy proposals, the limits of what can be done within the current 
EU supervisory structure have been reached, particularly when dealing 
                                                      
39 Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi (2008b), slides from his presentation at the Conference on 
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with the cross-border banking crisis. “It is only when the frameworks for 
regulation, supervision and crisis management match the actual structure 
of financial markets, that the negative externalities of financial crises can be 
managed properly,” to quote the Swedish central bank governor.40 A 
further step forward will thus require deeper institutional changes. We 
propose to follow mutatis mutandis the roadmap that led to the creation of 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in 1998. A European System 
of Financial Supervisors would bring all financial supervisory authorities in 
Europe under a single roof, while maintaining a plurality in the operational 
structure.  
3.2.1  A roadmap 
The roadmap would be composed of 3 parts: 1) the European Council 
formally mandates the High Level Expert Group on EU financial 
supervision (the de Larosière Committee) to analyse the optimal structure 
of financial oversight and propose concrete steps leading to a European 
System of Financial Supervisors; 2) European Financial Institute is created 
to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a European System of 
Financial Supervisors; 3) the European System of Financial Supervisors 
starts at a certain target date. 
Committees have been widely used in the European integration 
process, for broader political as well as for more technical issues. Not only 
are they apolitical in nature, but they also allow the pooling of the 
necessary technical expertise and knowledge. In addition, as a consensus 
has not yet emerged at European policy level of the need for a radical 
change in the structure of European financial supervision, which is also 
caused by the lack of a European public debate (as opposed to national 
policy debates) on the subject, a Committee could contribute to creating the 
necessary consent. 
                                                      
40 As remarked by the Swedish Governor Stefan Ingves, “Regulatory challenges of 
cross-border banking: Possible ways forward”, Conference on the Financial 
System, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, 21 August 2007 
(http://www.riksbank.com/pagefolders/31131/070821e.pdf). The Governor 
referred to the concrete challenges posed for supervisors by a bank like Nordea 
and called in this speech for a European Organisation for Financial Supervision 
(EOFS), a variant of the proposal discussed above. The Governor had already 
made this proposal in a speech in October 2006, in which he emphasised that 
upgrading CEBS was not the solution, as it would not make it a supervisor. 38 | MODELS FOR A EUROPEAN REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY REFORM 
The Committee’s mandate should be fourfold: 1) map the context; 2) 
analyse the different possible modalities in the institutional design of 
financial supervision and recommend the optimal structure for the EU; 3) 
outline in detail the objectives of the ESFS, its statute, primary tasks, 
administration, governance and financial resources; and 4) assess the 
relationship between the ESFS and the deposit insurance and resolution 
authorities. The context should provide the rationale why the current 
structure is no longer sufficient, and to what extent the supervisory 
structure is no longer in line with market integration. The different possible 
responses should emerge from this. It should set out which tasks can be 
better executed at a centralised level, and which at national or local level.  
Depending upon the specific recommendations of the Committee, a 
European Financial Institute should be created soon after the delivery of 
the recommendations of the Committee. Its task should be preparatory and 
at the same time operational. It should do the operational work for the 
establishment of an integrated ESFS and the structures that are needed to 
perform these tasks. Pending an eventual Treaty change, it could function 
as an EU-wide agency, set up by the European Council, and already be 
empowered to act on certain matters, such as the collection and 
amalgamation of supervisory information, the execution of certain 
supervisory tasks such as mediation and delegation of tasks amongst 
national authorities, and performing a crisis cell function. It could at the 
same time continue to perform the regulatory tasks of the actual Level 3 
Committees.  
In a third phase, the ESFS would start to function under:  
•  common objectives for financial supervision; 
•  a single statute; and 
•  a unified governance and accountability structure. 
Objectives for financial supervision have so far never been formally 
harmonised at EU level. Although the broad objectives are the same, 
safeguarding the stability of the financial system and protecting 
consumers/investors, important differences may exist in other objectives. 
The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) has as one of its objectives “the 
promotion of public understanding of the financial system”, which means 
that it needs to help users to understand what financial products they buy. 
To our knowledge, this is not necessarily an objective of other supervisory 
authorities in the EU. Acceptance of this objective would come to meet a 
growing need of financial literacy in a world with an increasing complexity 
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Much inspiration for the format of the statute and the governance 
and accountability structure could be taken from the ESCB statute. The 
Governing Council of the ESFS should consist of an Executive Board and of 
the Chairmen of the 27 national authorities, in the same way as the ESCB is 
governed. As with the ECB president, the chairman should report 
periodically to the Ecofin Council and the European Parliament on 
financial stability and supervisory issues. 
The Committee should analyse two specific issues carefully in more 
detail: 
i)  To what extent should a functional approach be followed to financial 
regulation, or should a more objective-based model be followed? 
ii)  How will subsidiarity be applied to financial supervision, i.e. which 
tasks can be more efficiently exercised centrally as compared to 
locally? 
The answer to the latter question could ease the response to the first, 
in the sense that conduct of business supervision will by and large remain 
at a local level, which implies that, from that perspective, a more objective-
based approach would be easier. The current crisis has also indicated that 
one of the reasons for separation between banking and insurance (and 
investment banking) supervision, i.e. the likelihood of systemic effects, is 
no longer tenable. As demonstrated above, the insurance sector can also be 
regarded as systemically important, which supports an objective-based 
approach. 
The Committee should also analyse how the links between the ESFS 
and the ECB will be worked out. This crisis has amply demonstrated that 
well developed communication lines between central banks and 
supervisors are extremely important, as are also clear divisions of 
responsibilities. We would strongly support a further clarification of the 
financial stability role of the ECB and the ESCB, while maintaining 
supervision outside their mandate.  
Another tricky issue to analyse is the maintenance of the home 
country control. We would argue in favour of a two-tier system, whereby 
supervisory responsibilities for systemically important EU-wide groups are 
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responsibilities would be delegated to a supervisory board in the ESFS, 
with day-to-day monitoring placed in the hands of the local supervisors.41 
3.2.2  Other possible scenarios 
Several other possible scenarios discussed above could be considered for 
moving forward: 
i.  Upgrading the Level 3 Committees into EU agencies  
The upgrading of the Level 3 Committees is more of a short-term, 
interim solution that raises more difficulties than it solves. It gives more 
powers to the Committees without addressing the differences of statutes 
and powers of the national authorities, and the related issues of 
accountability and control. It does not solve the supervisory problems 
discussed above. 
More generally, turning the Level 3 Committees into EU agencies 
would create three new regulatory agencies, in addition to the 28 that 
already exist at EU level. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, financial 
supervision issues could be better dealt under a single roof, and the 
institutional structure put in place as the result of a proper political process, 
rather than rapidly turning the existing Committees into agencies, and in 
this way circumventing a deeper discussion about the proper supervisory 
structure Europe needs. 
ii.  Using Art. 105.6 of the EU Treaty and giving more powers to the ECB for 
banking supervision 
The Treaty article is limited to banking supervision and to ‘specific 
tasks’ as related to banking supervision. The fact that insurance companies 
could not be part of it, and that it is limited to specific tasks means that it 
poses too many constraints to be used as a long-term solution. In addition, 
the question remains whether it would be appropriate for the ECB to 
exercise banking supervision within the ECB, whose main mandate is 
ensuring price stability. 
The report of the High Level Expert Group on EU financial 
supervision (de Larosière Group) would be of utmost importance in 
analysing the trends globally in this domain, and summarising the pros 
and cons of the different institutional models, to come to an optimal 
                                                      
41 See Schoenmaker & Oosterloo (2008) for a more detailed elaboration on this 
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structure for the EU, also including the degree of cooperation with the 
central bank. 
iii.  A European FSA, or single prudential and single conduct of business 
supervisor 
A fully-fledged single FSA, or single supervisors-by-objective, would 
not be adapted to the state of European market integration, and would not 
pass the subsidiarity test.  
3.3  A European Resolution Trust 
A necessary corollary to an ESFS should be a European Resolution Trust, as 
a safety net for short-term financial problems of EU-based financial 
institutions. The European Central Bank can only provide liquidity against 
collateral to keep the money market functioning, but has no powers to 
resolve a solvency crisis. A European Resolution Trust could be managed 
by the European Investment Bank (EIB) (Gros & Micossi, 2008b). Appeals 
for its funds would be decided by the Governing Council of the ESFS. The 
EIB is a public agency and issues guaranteed bonds to finance its 
operations. Its Board of Governors is made up of the ministers of finance of 
the member states. At present, the EIB has capital and reserves of €30 
billion, upon a total balance sheet of €300 billion. In addition, it can call 
upon an additional capital of €156 billion, which is currently uncalled for. 
Its capital is subscribed for on a proportional basis by the different member 
states. 
A European Resolution Trust could take equity stakes in or provide 
guaranteed loans to financial institutions in trouble. Support by the Trust 
would be based on adequate remuneration, to preserve the value of the 
public investment and to make sure that those who mismanaged would 
pay for the consequences. Losses could be distributed across member 
countries according to where they arose.  
A European Resolution Trust would be a much more appropriate 
safety net for European-wide active banks than having to rely on national 
solutions. It would be more neutral, as it would come from an EU-wide 
institution and do away with distortions created by national bail-out plans. 
It would be more efficient, as it would provide guarantees to depositors on 
a European-wide basis. And it would be more appropriate, certainly for 
those banks that have outgrown their national boundaries. The Trust 
would apply to troubled financial institutions of a certain size that have a 
Community dimension, based on a minimum share of their total EU assets 
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regulation could function as a benchmark to distinguish between 
Community and national competence.42  
In this context, one could also consider creating a federal deposit 
protection fund in the EU. Rather than attempting to further harmonise the 
different national deposit protection schemes, as the European Commission 
did in its proposal of 15 October 2008, it may be easier, and probably more 
efficient to create an EU-wide deposit protection fund from the beginning.43 
Although the minimum level of deposit protection was increased, the 
Commission proposal continues to leave a large degree of discretion to the 
member states, and does not solve the home-host problem. As with the 
Icelandic banks, citizens cannot be expected to know whether a foreign 
bank in a given country is a branch or subsidiary, and the different 
implications this distinction may have on the insurance of their deposits 
under the host or home deposit protection scheme. 
                                                      
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. In addition, the merger control has two 
exceptions in the application: the ‘Dutch clause’ (article 22) and the ‘German 
clause’ (article 9), which add more flexibility to the system to decide whether a 
merger is Community or national competence. 
43 The Commission proposal (Art. 12) requests the Commission to report on the 
possible introduction of a Community deposit-guarantee scheme, together with 
any appropriate proposals by the end of 2009, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay, 
COM(2008) 661 final. The EU Council endorsed the directive on December 2nd, the 
European Parliament on December 18th.  43 | 
 
4.  POSTSCRIPT: THE GLOBAL DIMENSION 
U policy-makers have rapidly brought the debate about the reform of 
financial regulation and supervision to the global stage by launching 
a debate for the reform of the Bretton-Woods institutions and calling 
for a G-20 meeting. While there rightly are certain issues that should also be 
discussed at global level, this should not stop the EU from bringing its own 
house in order. This is even more important since the EU represents more 
than 50%, on some accounts even more than 55%, of global bank assets. 
Seen from the perspective of developing countries, calling for concerted 
action on bank governance, supervision and oversight, means that those 
who are principally hosting these markets have to take the lead in 
controlling them.  
Table 7. Main indicators of the size of the EU’s financial markets, 2007 (€ billion) 
 World  EU  EU in %  US  US in %  
GDP 37,461.57  10,775.07  29%  9 482.65  25% 
Gross national savings   8,647.60   2,344.96  27%   1,053.74  12% 
Domestic stock market 
capitalisation 
44,714.11  10,116.56  23%  13,682.43 31% 
Total bank assets  58,229.99  29,632.88  51%   7,688.11  13% 
Note: According to the ECB, total EU bank assets are €41,072 billion, meaning that the EU 
percentage of global bank assets could well exceed 51%. As the ECB does not offer statistics 
on bank assets at global level, it is not possible to use ECB data for purposes of comparison. 
Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report September 2008; IMF International Financial 
Statistics. 
By taking a clear initiative along the lines outlined above, the EU 
could demonstrate to the outside world that it is assessing the full policy 
implications of the crisis and aligning its structure of financial oversight 
along lines similar to that used for monetary policy. It would at the same 
time be a clear indication globally that it is taking the lead in reforming the 
structure of financial oversight. 
E 44 | POSTSCRIPT: THE GLOBAL DIMENSION 
Asking the IMF to take a more important role in financial oversight, 
by undertaking Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAP), is 
noteworthy, but nothing dramatic. The IMF has been undertaking these 
assessments since 1999, and the outcome has been used by besieged 
supervisors in EU countries to claim that they had high ratings. In addition, 
the enforcement powers of the IMF are limited. But should not the EU start 
to undertake its own assessments? Regulatory compliance can be enforced 
by the EU, but this is not so easily achieved in the area of supervision. The 
creation of an ESFS could fill this void.  
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Key financial indicators of the top 5 banks in the EU and selected other countries (2007) 
Country 
Total assets 
(mil €) 
Total 
equity 
(mil €) 
Loans to 
customers 
(mil €) 
Deposits from 
customers 
(mil €) 
Asset/ 
GDP (%) 
Loans/ 
deposits (%) 
Equity/ 
assets (%) 
Austria 698475  44722  392763  299996  257.9 130.9  6.4 
Belgium 1550751  62342  621514  598792  463.0 103.8  4.0 
Bulgaria 17080  1976  11259  11126  59.1 101.2  11.6 
Cyprus 83675  6623  44702  55020  535.1 81.2  7.9 
Czech Republic  105850  7276  51718  74986  83.3 69.0  6.9 
Denmark 625020  20960  373771  187028  274.5 199.8  3.4 
Estonia 34665  2653  27278  14662  227.0 186.0  7.7 
Finland 274996  21561  140087  91409  153.0 153.3  7.8 
France 5550460  196302  1593553  1580763  293.3 100.8  3.5 
Germany 3990498  104581  931919  988265  164.7 94.3  2.6 
Greece 287210  22754  196660  165573  125.9 118.8  7.9 
Hungary 69416  6359  49255  38481  68.6 128.0  9.2 
Ireland 769816  27508  480773  244336  403.9 196.8  3.6 
Italy 2006529  147987  1221732  758484  130.7 161.1  7.4 CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS MORE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN THE EU | 49 
Latvia 21620  1797  14315  9899  108.4 144.6  8.3 
Lithuania 23035  1540  17047  10418  82.2 163.6  6.7 
Luxembourg 309875  15998  103668  104238  854.2 99.5  5.2 
Malta 14010  1698  6421  8981  258.7 71.5  12.1 
Netherlands 2954809  113227  1500757  1197983  521.1 125.3  3.8 
Poland 106567  10756  62595  79588  34.5 78.6  10.1 
Portugal 317520  18585  221113  144597  194.7 152.9  5.9 
Romania 40746  3247  25360  23951  33.6 105.9  8.0 
Slovakia 31029  2320  16240  22151  56.6 73.3  7.5 
Slovenia 31719  2140  21896  16114  92.0 135.9  6.7 
Spain 1934416  138873  1838315  734621  184.1 250.2  7.2 
Sweden 1013630  40785  623086  327833  305.4 190.1  4.0 
UK 6406952  248052  2846061  2280745  312.9 124.8  3.9 
EU 29270369  1272622  13433858  10070040  237.2 133.4  4.3 
Iceland 129934  8228  82684  39809  890.0 207.7  6.3 
Norway 243316  13004  195088  110360  85.7 176.8  5.3 
Switzerland 2357865  74747  557616  807249  756.3 69.1  3.2 
USA 4474314  339328  1966141  2156126  44.4 91.2  7.6 
Source: Bankscope, Eurostat. 50 | 
Annex 2. Timeline of the main crisis events and policy responses, 
summer 2007-present 
Date Event 
 
9 Aug. 07  BNP Paribas suspends redemptions of three money market funds 
exposed to US ABS assets. AXA had earlier announced support for 
its funds 
9 Aug. 07  European Central Bank (ECB) injects €95 billion overnight to 
improve liquidity. Injections by other central banks 
17 Aug. 07   Federal Reserve approves a temporary 50 bp reduction in the 
discount rate, extends term financing, and notes it will ‘accept a 
broad range of collateral’ 
13 Sept. 07   Bank of England announces that it will widen the range on banks’ 
reserves targets within which they are remunerated at bank rate 
14 Sept. 07   Bank of England announces it has provided a liquidity support 
facility to Northern Rock  
15 Sept. 07  Informal Ecofin Council in Porto at which ministers discuss financial 
stability arrangements 
17 Sept. 07   Following a retail deposit run, the UK Chancellor announces a 
government guarantee for Northern Rock’s existing deposits 
9 Oct. 07  Ecofin Council decides on a roadmap for EU arrangements for 
financial stability 
Oct. 07   Citi, Merrill Lynch and UBS report significant write-downs, top 
management changes 
Nov. 07  Several banks support SIVs or take them on their balance sheet 
4 Dec. 07  Ecofin Council discusses the EU’s regulatory and supervisory 
architecture 
11 Dec. 07  The Italian finance minister Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa calls for a 
single financial rulebook and European supervisory agencies 
20 Dec. 07   Bear Stearns announces expected 2007 Q4 write-downs 
Jan. 08  Announcements of significant 2007 Q4 losses by Citi and Merrill 
Lynch, among others 
24 Jan. 08   Société Générale reveals trading losses resulting from fraudulent 
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17 Feb. 08   UK government announces temporary nationalisation of Northern 
Rock 
11 Mar. 08   Federal Reserve announces the introduction of a Term Securities 
Lending Facility and Bank of England announces it will maintain its 
expanded 3-month long-term repo against a wider range of high-
quality collateral 
16 Mar. 08   JPMorgan Chase & Co. agrees to purchase Bear Stearns. Federal 
Reserve provides $30 billion non-recourse funding 
4 April 08  Informal Ecofin Council in Ljubljana agrees on an updated MoU 
between supervisory authorities, central banks and finance 
ministries 
21 Apr. 08   Bank of England launches its Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) to 
allow banks to swap temporarily their high-quality mortgage-
backed and other securities for UK Treasury bills 
15 May 08  Ecofin Council updates the roadmap and assigns new tasks to the 
Level 3 Committees. It publishes a new MoU 
16 June 08   Lehman Brothers confirms a net loss of $2.8 billion in Q2 
13 July 08   US Treasury announces a rescue plan for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac 
15 July 08   US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issues an emergency 
order to enhance investor protection against ‘naked short-selling’ 
7 Sept. 08   Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac taken into conservatorship 
15 Sept.08   Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy. Bank of America announces 
purchase of Merrill Lynch 
16 Sept. 08   US government provides emergency loan to AIG of $85 billion, in 
exchange for a 79.9% stake and right to veto dividend payments 
18 Sept. 08   Lloyds TSB/HBOS merger announced 
18 Sept. 08  FSA announces regulations prohibiting short-selling of financial 
shares 
19 Sept. 08   SEC prohibits short-selling in financial companies, followed by other 
securities commissions in the EU and worldwide 
21 Sept. 08   Federal Reserve approves transformation of Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley into bank holding companies 
29 Sept. 08   Bradford & Bingley is nationalised by the UK government. Abbey 
buys its branches and retail deposit book 52 | ANNEXES 
29 Sept. 08   Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg governments announce they will 
invest €11.2 billion in Fortis 
30 Sept. 08   Dexia receives equity capital injection from Belgian, French and 
Luxembourg governments and from existing shareholders 
30 Sept. 08  Irish government announces full guarantee of bank liabilities 
3 Oct. 08   US House of Representatives passes $700 billion government plan to 
rescue the US financial sector (having voted against an earlier version of 
the plan on 29 September 2008) 
3 Oct. 08   FSA raises the limit of the deposit guarantee to £50,000 (with effect 
from 7 October 2008) 
3 Oct. 08   Dutch government acquires Fortis Bank Nederland (Holding) N.V. 
4 Oct. 08  G4 meeting in Paris 
6 Oct. 08   German authorities announce €50 billion package to save Hypo Real 
Estate  
6 Oct. 08   BNP Paribas announces it has agreed to take control of Fortis’ 
operations in Belgium and Luxembourg as well as the international 
banking franchises 
7 Oct. 08  Ecofin Council agrees to raise the minimum level of deposit 
protection to €50,000 in the EU 
7 Oct. 08   Icelandic banks Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing were put into 
administration, causing EU-wide ramifications 
8 Oct. 08   UK financial sector support package announced, including provision 
of capital to UK incorporated banks and guarantees for new short to 
medium-term senior unsecured debt issuance  
8 Oct. 08   Coordinated interest rate cut of 50 basis points (including the Bank 
of England, the ECB and the Federal Reserve) 
12 Oct. 08  Eurogroup meeting in Paris at level of heads of state to which 
Gordon Brown is also invited 
14 Oct. 08  Several EU governments announce national financial sector bail-out 
plans  
16 Oct. 08  European Council meets, decides to create a financial crisis cell 
19 Oct. 08   Dutch government injects €10 billion into ING as subordinated debt 
26 Oct. 08  Belgian government injects €3.5 billion into KBC as subordinated 
debt 
7 Nov. 08  Informal European Council meeting to prepare G-20 CONCRETE STEPS TOWARDS MORE INTEGRATED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT IN THE EU | 53 
15 Nov. 08  G-20 Meeting in Washington 
24 Nov. 08  US government injects €20 billion in Citi and guarantees $306 billion 
of its real estate loans and securities 
28 Nov. 08  UK government takes a majority stake in RBS 
2 Dec. 08  Ecofin Council agrees on the amendments to the EU’s capital 
requirements and deposit guarantee schemes directive  
4 Dec. 08  ECB cuts interest rate with 75 bp to 2.50% 
11 Dec. 08  SEC charges Bernard L. Madoff for $50 billion Ponzi scheme fraud, 
exposing European banks and investors to losses of $10 billion 
16 Dec. 08  Fed reduces interest rate to 0.25% 
 
Source: Drawn and updated from Bank of England (2008), Financial Stability Review, Issue 24, 
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Annex 3. Government bail-out plans for the financial sector (as of end December 2008) 
Country  € billion  Tools/Legislation  Eligible Institutions  Conditionality  Date 
Approved 
by European 
Commission 
Denmark  4.6  Guarantee scheme; bank wind-up scheme  All banks in Denmark that 
have a banking licence and 
participate in the Sector 
Fund 
Limited to fundamentally sound 
financial institutions; banks pay 
premium to remunerate debt 
guarantee; insolvent banks to be 
wound up using private funds 
when possible 
10 Oct 08 
Ireland  n/a  Guarantee scheme for deposits and debt 
issued by credit institutions between 29 
Sept 2008 to 28 Sept 2010  
Banks with a systemic 
relevance for the Irish 
economy 
Firm will be subject to specific terms 
and conditions so that the 
taxpayers' interest can be protected 
13 Oct 08 
United 
Kingdom 
608  €60 billion used to buy preference shares in 
banks; €240 billion of short-term loans; 
guarantees of up to €308 billion  
All UK financial institutions  Government will consider adjusting 
dividend policies and executive 
compensation 
13 Oct 08 
amended on 
23 Dec 08 
Germany  500  €400 billion in loan guarantees; up to €80 
billion for recapitalisation of banks; €20 
billion to cover potential losses from loans  
Credit institutions, financial 
service providers, insurance 
companies and pension 
funds, operators of 
securities and commodities 
exchanges 
Conditions on state remuneration; 
restrictions for executive pay; 
capital requirements; distribution of 
dividends; reporting requirements 
28 Oct 08 
amended on 
12 Dec 08 
Sweden  152  €150 billion in guarantee scheme covering 
new short and medium term debt and 
support for solvent banks and mortgage 
institutions, instruments with a maturity of 
three years maximum, or exceptionally five 
years for covered bonds, €2billion for equity 
participations  
 
Open to all solvent banks 
incorporated in Sweden 
Guarantees to be remunerated, 
restrictions on expansion and 
marketing of beneficiaries 
restrictions on compensation for 
their top executives 
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Portugal  20  State guarantees for financing agreements 
and the emission of non subordinated short 
and medium term debt 
All banks incorporated in 
Portugal 
The beneficiary who has called on a 
guarantee has to reimburse the state 
in full, either by paying back the 
loan or by exchanging it for 
preferential shares.  
30 Oct 08 
France  286  €21 billion capital injection into France's 
banks; bank debt guarantee of €265 bn. 
All French financial 
institutions 
Remuneration mechanism; banks 
will have to provide monthly 
reports on capital use. Firms will 
also have to sign a 'code of ethics' 
31 Oct 08 
updated on 
08 Dec 08 
Netherlands  200  Guarantees for unsecured loans.  Any institution defined as a 
bank and having its 
corporate domicile in the 
Netherlands; has substantial 
business in the Netherlands, 
and an acceptable solvency 
ratio 
Guaranteed debt instruments are 
subject to a fee of 50 basis points if 
the tenure is no more than one year, 
and 50 basis points and the 5 year 
average if more than one year; 
remuneration restrictions 
31 Oct 08 
Spain   130-150  €100 billion in state guarantees; €30 billion - 
€50 billion to buy 'healthy assets' from 
banks.  
All solvent credit 
institutions registered in 
Spain having a share of 
1/1000 of the credit market 
restrictions on expansion and 
marketing of beneficiaries 
4 Nov 08 
amended on 
23 Dec 08 
Finland  50  Guarantee to cover, against remuneration, 
the issuance of new short and medium term 
non-subordinated debt between 90 days 
and three years. Five year maturity for 
mortgage-backed bonds only 
All solvent Finnish deposit 
and mortgage banks, 
including Finnish 
subsidiaries of foreign banks 
Restrictions on beneficiaries' 
balance sheet growth with regard to 
national and EU averages, 
limitations on expansion and 
marketing and strict conditions for 
staff remuneration or bonus 
payments 
 
14 Nov 08 
Italy  60  Guarantee on new liabilities between 3 
months and 5 years; 6 month renewable 
swap scheme between matching bank debt 
certificates and Treasury bills (max. €40 
billion); recapitalisation scheme of €15-20 
billion 
Solvent banks authorised in 
Italy, including the 
subsidiaries of foreign 
groups 
A market oriented pricing 
mechanism; appropriate safeguards 
against abuses. Remuneration 
clauses for recapitalisation, special 
redemption price 
14 Nov 08 
amended on 
23 Dec 08 56 | ANNEXES 
Greece  28  State to buy non core tier 1 preference 
shares; guarantee scheme for debt between 
3 months and 3 years; securities scheme, 
government bonds lent against bank 
collateral 
All financially sound credit 
institutions licensed in 
Greece 
Beneficiaries to pay a market-
oriented remuneration  
19 Nov 08 
Belgium  n/a  Guarantee begins 9 October 2008 and 
finishes 31 October 2009; Guarantees must 
be applied for between 9 October 2008 and 
31 October 2009 
Any institution that is facing 
liquidity or insolvency 
problems that could have 
implications on the Belgian 
economy 
Firms must promise to use 
government aid to institute 
measures to improve the financial 
situation of their firm; the Minster 
of Finance determines the 
conditions of the guarantee, 
including issues of remuneration 
20 Nov 08 
Austria  100  Government to guarantee €75 billion in 
loans, inject up to €15 billion in capital, and 
allocate up to €10 billion to guarantee public 
savings  
  Dividend restriction and a 
remuneration corridor 
10 Dec 08 
Slovenia  12  The state guarantee covers, against 
remuneration, the issuance of new short 
and medium term non-subordinated debt 
with a maturity between 90 days and five 
years. The scheme's overall budget is 
capped at €12 billion. 
The scheme is open to all 
solvent Slovenian credit 
institutions, including 
Slovenian subsidiaries of 
foreign banks. 
Beneficiaries will be subject to 
behavioural commitments to avoid 
an abusive use of the state support 
12 Dec 08 
United States  557  €200 billion purchase of preferred shares 
with possibility of an additional €80 billion; 
further €277 billion for guarantees and 
deposit insurance 
Bank holding companies, 
financial holding companies, 
insured depository 
institutions, and savings and 
loan holding companies; 
foreign controlled entities 
not eligible.  
Restrictions on executive 
compensation; participation is not 
completely voluntary 
n/a 
Switzerland  45  Government to buy €41 billion in USD and 
non-USD debt; €4 billion capital injection. 
UBS. Credit Suisse turned 
down state aid offer 
UBS must commit to increasing its 
capital base 
n/a 
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